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1. Introduction 
 
Those of us interested in thinking about outré possibilities will be familiar with scenarios where there 
are large temporal and causal loops—for example, scenarios where time goes in a loop, so that e.g. a 
big crunch is immediately followed by the big bang.  (I intend here a "one time around" loop, as 
opposed to the kind of eternal recurrence where there are infinitely many bang-to-crunch stretches, laid 
end to end.)  In these scenarios, there are temporal loops and causal loops, but only ones that go all the 
way around the history of the universe.  One example of these, of more than just metaphysical interest, 
is the closed temporal loop universe described by Gödel 1949, which appears to show that such 
temporal loops are allowed by Einstein's general theory of relativity. 
 
Scenarios that are less familiar are ones where there are cosmic grounding loops:  where the whole 
structure of grounding ensures that if you follow the chain around from any point, after enough steps 
you can arrive back where you started.  In this paper I want to distinguish several interesting ways of 
thinking about such grounding loops, argue for the coherence of such models of grounding, consider 
whether they are metaphysically possible, and discuss how we might embed grounding structures 
which are locally irreflexive, anti-symmetric and transitive in worlds with such cosmic loops. 
 
Any loop of grounding, of course, enables one in principle to trace it around and get back to the start.  
What is distinctive about cosmic loops is that they would require going around "the whole way", in a 
way that is analogous to the way that a cosmic temporal loop would require going through every other 
time to arrive back at the original time.  The nice thing about times is that, when they are well behaved, 
they come with a complete ordering, but this is not true in general for objects that stand in grounding 
relationships.  So it is a bit harder to say what "going around the whole way" would amount to for a 
grounding loop.  It would be convenient if everything came with a grounding "level", as is supposed by 
some simple versions of the "layer cake" model of the special sciences:  chemistry on top of physics, 
biology on top of chemistry, psychology on top of biology, and so on.  Then we could insist that a 
cosmic loop of ground pass through all of the levels before coming back to the original one.  Other 
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patterns in the world come with convenient layers that are less all-encompassing:  the relation of part-
to-whole can be used to order my fingernail as part of my finger, my finger as part of my hand, my 
hand as part of me.  On its own, it will not serve as a convenient way of ordering everything, since 
there are distinct hierarchies of parts:  my table leg is not part of my leg, nor vice versa.  We would 
have a cosmic loop of part-to-whole if we started with one world (call it world 1) which had many 
atoms at one end of the part-whole hierarchy, and at the other end of the part-whole hierarchy a 
Universe that contained everything as parts, and considered another world, world 2, with the same 
pattern of part-to-whole except that the thing which was the Universe of world 1 was part of all the 
things which were atoms of world 1.  In world 2, you could follow the chain of "part of" relations 
starting at the object which is world 1's Universe, right around to that very object again.  World 2 would 
plausibly contain a cosmic grounding loop too, given the common assumption that wholes are 
grounded in their parts.  (Perhaps world 2 would only be an impossible world, rather than a possible 
one: more on this question below.)  
 
While I have hopefully said enough to get the idea of cosmic loops across, I have not yet provided a 
general definition.  Rather than bogging down in a specification that avoids various tricky corner cases, 
I will present some exemplars which we may use as paradigms:  especially since the issues that arise 
for my exemplars don't really depend on whether we have pinned down a unique concept of cosmic 
loops.  One thing I do want to leave open, at least as far as the definition of "cosmic loop" goes, is that 
cosmic loops of ground might co-exist with shorter loops of ground.  Again, time provides a useful 
analogy:  even if the entire universe is a great temporal loop, say with a big bang at the "start" also 
serving as a big crunch at the "end", there may also be shorter loops created by time-travel machines or 
unusual spatio-temporal wormholes.  Likewise, even if there are cosmic loops of ground that go "all the 
way around", there may also be short loops (e.g. the fact that there are some facts may ground itself1).  
I also want to allow that a loop can be cosmic without bringing everything in a universe into its scope:  
a layer-cake universe might have several cosmic loops that contain a member from each layer, but do 
not share any members. 
 
When we are considering cosmic loop scenarios, which loops will be grounding loops will depend on 
what kinds of relationships go along with relationships of grounding in those scenarios.  I suppose that 
                                                
1 See Fine 2010, though of course Fine himself is not tempted to allow that this fact grounds itself.  It is instructive to see 
how difficult it is to avoid allowing it to be a ground of itself, if we make some other standard assumptions about 
grounding. 
 3 
we could brutely stipulate grounding connections between different entities or facts, but it will be more 
natural, and more familiar, to think of grounding as going along with other relationships, such as the 
part-whole relation or the determinate-determinable relation.  (Though there are of course debates to be 
had about which direction grounding goes even in these cases: part-to-whole, or whole-to-part, or 
sometimes one and sometimes the other, for example.) 
 
Rival theories of grounding differ on whether grounding claims are most perspicuously to be expressed 
using a sentential or propositional connective, or a relational predicate.  That is, if we wish to express a 
particular grounding connection to do with being scarlet and being red, whether G(Apple A is scarlet, 
Apple A is red), or G(A's scarletness, A's redness) best gets to the heart of the matter, assuming 
determinates ground determinables.  I will talk as if grounding is a relation between objects in this 
paper, but this for convenience rather than to take a stand on this question.  I will also not be making 
much of the distinction, often drawn, between full and partial ground:  some cases I will discuss below 
are best seen as loops of full grounding and others only of partial grounding, but little relevant will 
hang on which are which.  Finally, I will restrict my discussion to talk of singular grounding, instead of 
also talking about cases where some things collectively ground another (or some things are collectively 
grounded by a thing, or when some things collectively ground some others): this is not to take a stand 
on whether there is any irreducibly plural grounding, but again only because that distinction is not 
important for current purposes. 
 
Warning:  well-brought up readers of this paper are likely to have been taught that no sense can be 
made of talk of loops of grounding, cosmic or otherwise, so may find the cases to be discussed below 
repugnant to their grounding sensibilities.  I would encourage those readers to do their best to get their 
heads around the cases, perhaps in the spirit of intellectual exploration of foreign conceptual 
landscapes.  I will turn to discussing whether any of these examples are possible, coherent, or even 
conceivable in section 3.   
 
2.  Examples of Cosmic Loops 
 
One of my favourite thought-experimental curiosities is a universe described by Rudy Rucker in his 
Infinity and the Mind (Rucker 1982 pp 33-34). 
 
The Rucker Loop 
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What appears to be our entire universe is just a sub-atomic particle in a larger universe, which is but a 
sub-atomic particle in a yet larger 'universe', and so on ad infinitum.  This is also true in the other 
direction:  what seem to us now to be our smallest sub-atomic particles have the internal structure of 
entire 'universe', the sub-atomic particles of which are entire 'universes' themselves, and so on ad 
infinitum.  What is distinctive about Rucker's thought is that this world also loops:  go up through 
enough stages and you will arrive back at one of our sub-atomic particles, or go down through enough 
stages and you will reach our entire universe. 
 
Rucker focuses on aspects of this imagined world like it having no absolute scale from smallest to 
largest (nothing is once-and-for-all the smallest or the largest, for example), and the prospect that it 
could nevertheless contain finitely many objects, despite e.g. everything being divisible without end.  
But the Rucker Loop suggests an interesting pattern of grounding, as well.  It is often thought that a 
whole is grounded in its parts:  and when there is a loop like this, that suggests that there is a loop in 
grounding.  Even if we reversed this grounding connection, so that the parts of our cosmos are all 
grounded in the cosmos, we would get a loop of grounding—our cosmos grounded in the one 'above', 
grounded in the one 'above' that... grounded in our cosmos.  Furthermore, we can suppose the loop (or 
the many loops) are all-encompassing—that no cosmos lacks a step in the loop, and that we have to go 
through a cosmos of each other level before arriving back at the cosmos we began with.  Let us focus 
on one of the loops in this world, that begins and ends with our familiar cosmos.  This loop is cosmic in 
the sense I have in mind for this paper. 
 
Another cosmic loop of the part-to-whole relationship that has been discussed in the literature is one 
suggested by a story of Borges (Borges 2000, originally published 1949).  In Borges's story, he 
describes an object, "the Aleph", which, on one reading, has everything in the universe as a proper part, 
even though it itself is a small globe found in a cellar in Buenos Aires.  (On another reading, the Aleph 
merely provides a viewpoint on everything.  Borges notes this reading within the story, suggesting that 
the true object that contains everything else in the universe may be a pillar in Cairo. I suppose it could 
be contested whether the part-to-whole loop goes all the way around mereological levels in this case, 
but Borges seems to describe at least a near-cosmic sized loop.)  Sanford 1993 and Parsons unpublished 
both discuss Borges's Aleph, on the interpretation where the Aleph does contain everything as a part 
(and so looking into the Aleph, one even sees the Aleph itself within its basement, containing within 
itself the whole universe...).  They both find it worthwhile to try to make coherent sense of it as a 
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possibility.  Parsons further seems to suggest that if the Aleph is genuinely possible then the part-whole 
relationship is not anti-symmetric and transitive.  I am not sure of Parsons's reasoning here, but perhaps 
he is using "anti-symmetric" in a way that a relation is anti-symmetric only if necessarily the relation 
does not relate an object to a distinct object and also vice versa. 
 
Once the option of cosmic loops is noticed, it is easy to come up with other examples.  Here are two 
examples that may be of use as thought experiments, or as pieces of speculative theology for those who 
are so inclined.   
 
The Last Shall Be First 
 
In this scenario, there is a god – let me label her TLSBF (for ‘the last shall be first’).  TLSBF is both 
immanent and transcendent in the following way.  (Leave aside any quibbles for now about whether 
this characterisation is strictly "immanence" or "transcendence" in the senses used in e.g. Christian 
theology.)  TLSBF is within in the smallest places:  let Her be a proper part of each spacetime point, or 
if you prefer let physical spacetime be gunky with no atomic physical parts, with Her being a proper 
part of every region.  We could also directly specify that she is located within every point (or every 
gunky region), or perhaps her being parts of those points and regions will be enough, on some 
conceptions of location, to already guarantee this.  Thus she is immanent in her world.  (We may add 
that she is also part of every physical object too, if you wish.) 
 
TLSBF is at the "bottom".  But She is also at the "top".  There is a region which has all other regions as 
sub-regions (the “universal region”), and TLBSF is located at that region.  There is an entity which has 
everything in the universe as parts (as is standard in most theories of parts and wholes), and that 
universal entity is identical to TLSBF Herself.  Let us explicitly include all the spacetime regions 
among her parts.  Finally, let us stipulate that in this scenario, entities are grounded in their proper 
parts:  so TLSBF is grounded in her parts, and there is a chain of grounds that lead from TLSBF to 
herself. 
 
Let us restrict our attention to concrete objects, and leave aside questions about the grounding of 
abstract objects (if any) in our scenario.  The TLSF scenario is incompatible with classical extensional 
mereology, which does not allow an object to be a proper part of itself (or indeed to stand in the 
ancestral of “proper part” to itself – since classical extensional mereology insists that “proper part” is 
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transitive, in ruling out one it rules out the other).  Indeed, even much weaker mereologies may rule out 
this scenario unless we can find some other part of spacetime points to be co-parts of those points with 
TLSBF.   
 
The One and the Cosmos: Emanating and Constituting 
 
Another class of cosmic loop scenarios come into view if we pay attention to the option of saying that 
there are several kinds of grounding (whether this is because grounding is a genus which admits of 
various species, or because grounding, though unified, holds in different kinds of cases). 
 
Consider a world which is in one respect rather neo-Platonist.  The One is ultimate source of 
emanation, and this relationship passes through Soul, Wisdom, and other such luminaries, down 
through Forms, through the Intelligences that are to be found throughout the world, and finally to brute 
material entities, furthest from the One.  Emanation goes with grounding, so that e.g. Wisdom is 
immediately grounded in the One, the Soul is immediately grounded in Wisdom... and the small 
material parts of intelligences are grounded in the intelligences they emanate from.  (I don't suppose 
that this specific emanation structure matches that posited by any particular neo-Platonist, but you 
should be able to tinker with the emanation structure somewhat without affecting the point of the 
example.) 
 
On the other hand, the smallest material parts make up the objects they belong to, those larger material 
objects constitute the Intelligences, the natures or activities of the Intelligences constitute the Forms, 
the Forms compose the Soul, which constitutes Wisdom, which is the Constitution of the One itself.  
Wholes are grounded in their parts, and the constituted by what constitutes it (at least in the scenario 
being described), so in this respect, grounding runs from the lowest to the highest. 
 
This is not the same kind of loop as in the previous two cases.  In the other two cases, the cosmic loop 
followed a circle:  while we could pick our universe as the place to start and end in the Rucker Loop, it 
occupied no particularly privileged place, and while TLSBF served both as a proper part of spacetime 
points and as the Universe, we could follow the entire loop around by going from part to whole at each 
step.  In this case, however, we have two grounding arrows facing in opposite directions: part-to-whole 
and constitution going in one direction, and emanating coming the other.  To follow grounding around 
to get a loop requires going all the way up and then all the way down again. 
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A variant of this case can be imagined that would have a hybrid kind of loop.  In this variant, the 
meanest of the material particles, furthest along the path of emanation from the One, each directly 
constitute the One and so directly and fully ground it.  (Perhaps they do this by being simple, and 
therefore they are the ones that give rise to the One.  Perhaps our hypothetical neo-Platonist 
constructing the account of this scenario has been meditating on the second half of Plato's Parmenides.)  
This loop connects most saliently at the One, which directly grounds Wisdom through emanation, and 
is directly grounded by each of the ones through constitution.  While grounding goes in a circle in this 
variant, none of the relations that go along with grounding do:  emanation and part-whole are one-way 
only, as is the "direct constitution" link from the material simples to the One. 
 
Imaginative readers will probably be able to think of other interesting scenarios containing cosmic 
loops, but the three examples above should be enough to illustrate the idea and give some idea of the 
range of cosmic loop scenarios.  The three cases presented are all cases taking entities to be grounded 
by other entities:  those interested in expressing grounding using a sentential connective in the manner 
of Fine 2001 should be able to construct further scenarios where there are cosmic loops of such 
grounding without involving any cosmic loops of grounding between entities, but I have stretched our 
theoretical imaginations enough for one paper, so I will refrain from exploring any options of that sort 
here. 
 
3.  Cosmic Loops and Principles of Ground 
 
Cosmic loops, on the face of it, conflict with some standard constraints on a theory of ground put 
forward in the literature.  Ground is normally defined so that it is transitive, asymmetric and irreflexive, 
which would rule out loops:  any loop would result, by transitivity, in something grounding itself.  
Furthermore, the correct principles of ground, whatever they are, are often thought to be necessary.  (At 
least metaphysically necessary, though sometimes these principles are discussed as if they are partially 
definitional of ground, so may be intended to be analyticities as well.)  Can cosmic loops be dismissed 
as impossibilities? 
 
I would be tempted to argue that such loops are possible in some generous sense, since descriptions of 
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them are coherent.2  But even if they are not possible at all (in any worldly or alethic sense, as opposed 
to being e.g. doxastic possibilities), I do not think this would justify an immediate dismissal of any 
discussion of cosmic loops.  One main reason for this is that we are interested in deciding what to think 
about which principles of ground are correct, so even if alternatives to the true theory of ground are all 
metaphysical impossibilities, working out which theory of ground is correct may well require us to 
judge between alternatives to select the best one.  In metaphysical inquiry, as elsewhere, dogmatic 
rejection of alternative theories as even being fit for discussion would be a terrible methodology, since 
it is often only by appreciating what alternative theoretical options there are to one's preferred views 
that we can work out whether our current opinions are better than alternatives, and so whether they are 
worthy of our continued belief. 
 
Those uncongenial to these cosmic loop scenarios might doubt that they are even coherent.  Anti-
symmetry and transitivity are often put forward as if they are axiomatic of grounding, so some may 
suspect that it is a conceptual truth (or perhaps an analytic truth) that there are no loops of ground.3  
Perhaps there is some concept of a grounding-like relation that, by conceptual stipulation, is anti-
symmetric and transitive.  But I doubt that such a concept is a very useful tool for investigating the 
world.  One of the central aims of a theory of grounding, I would have thought, would be to discover 
what sorts of fundamental (and less-than-fundamental) metaphysical relationships obtain between 
entities (and/or what connections, more broadly speaking, hold between facts).  If the important 
relationships in our world display the sort of loop structure suggested, a theory of ground should reflect 
that:  it would be far less fruitful to declare that we have discovered there is no grounding, but there is 
merely grounding*, a relation that is found where we thought grounding might be, with all of the 
features of grounding except (e.g.) transitivity.  Substantial metaphysical progress is not to be made by 
analytic stipulation, so we should select our conceptual tools with an eye to what can be used to 
illuminate our target of inquiry, rather than to try to bake in some of our favoured conclusions about 
that target in advance.  Those who insist that according to their concept of grounding we can rule out 
cosmic loops of ground as incoherent are invited to deploy a concept better suited for substantive 
inquiry. 
                                                
2 They are possible in at least some of the ways I distinguish as candidates to be "metaphysical possibility" in Nolan 2011, 
though perhaps not in all. 
3 A similar concern can be raised about whether it is a conceptual falsehood that the part-whole relation allows of loops: van 
Inwagen 1993, in response to Sanford's Aleph example (see p<4>, above), takes the line that the Aleph case involves a 
conceptual falsehood.  I am tempted by a similar response in the case of part-whole as I am in the case of grounding:  I 
would argue against the conceptual truth of e.g. asymmetry and transitivity of the part-whole relation, just as I argue 
against elevating principles of grounding to conceptual truths in the main text. 
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Some readers may find cases of cosmic loops so bizarre or outrageous that they may doubt that cosmic 
loops are even conceivable.  (I intend to use "conceivable" in its ordinary sense, or something like its 
ordinary sense, and not in any of the stipulative senses introduced by philosophers such as Chalmers 
2002.)  As against this, it is hard to know what to offer in response beyond the plain fact that I and 
others do conceive of such scenarios—Rucker seems to have conceived of one of the scenarios above, I 
came up with two of the scenarios above myself, and I hopefully described them in enough detail to get 
across what is going on in them, at least to those not antecedently committed to finding such scenarios 
unintelligible.  Perhaps some familiarity with neo-Platonist emanation will help for scenario 3.  No 
doubt there will be those who suspect neo-Platonist emanation is unintelligible on its own:  those 
people face an interesting psycho-historical challenge in explaining how hundreds of people over 
hundreds of years seemed to communicate and debate about emanation, without any of them 
conceiving of it. 
 
Why would there be resistance to the claims that these scenarios are intelligible or imaginable or 
conceivable?  One source of such resistance will be from people who think that conceivability is a good 
guide to possibility (Yablo 1993), and who also judge the scenarios I described to be impossible.  Once 
one thinks that one's grasp of possibility is usually mediated by conceiving, it will be easy to pass from 
the thought that something seems impossible to the thought that it must be inconceivable.  While being 
able to conceive of something often goes along with its possibility, trying to insist on too tight a 
connection either leaves one at the mercy of counterexamples to be found everywhere from 
philosophical theorising to Escher to the far reaches of speculative fiction, or encourages a dangerous 
attitude that the thing to do with an alternative one takes to be impossible is to try to convince oneself 
that one does not understand it.  That would be an unhelpfully dogmatic move in many areas of 
science—imagine if opponents of the general theory of relativity had all reacted that way—and it 
seems no less dogmatic in philosophy.4     
 
Another source of resistance will be less motivated by theory:  I expect some people will find it 
difficult to understand the scenarios described, and not (necessarily) due to any defect in my 
presentation.  One the face of it, one might have thought that people would take their own inability to 
                                                
4 A third option would be to allow that many more things are possible than one might have thought, just because we can 
form some conception of them:  see Mortensen 1989.  But why engage in a large revision of our views of what is 
possible rather than a minor revision of a theory of the connection between conceivability and possibility? 
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conceive something as very weak evidence that it is inconceivable, especially when there are others 
who apparently conceive of the scenario under discussion.  In some areas, this does seem to be people’s 
response:  those who find they cannot conceive of relativistic spacetime, for example, are often willing 
to defer to experts who claim to conceive of it, and so count relativistic spacetime as conceivable.  But 
it is a curious fact that philosophers who have trouble conceiving of a scenario proposed by other 
philosophers are often keen to pronounce such scenarios inconceivable.  (This often happens to me in 
conversation with philosophers when I claim to conceive things others claim they cannot, at least.) 
 
To those inclined to take these cases to be inconceivable for this reason, let me remind them that 
familiarity with unusual scenarios can be mind-expanding, and to play with cosmic loop scenarios for a 
while before being confident that the scenarios are inconceivable, and not merely ruled out by 
principles that they endorse. 
 
4.  Recovering "local" irreflexivity, symmetry and transitivity in cosmic loops 
 
A scenario can be a cosmic loop scenario even if grounding is closed under transitivity in it:  these are 
cases where everything in a circle of ground grounds everything in that circle, including itself.   But a 
more natural way to understand many of these circles of ground as being intransitive:  while A grounds 
B which grounds C which grounds D which grounds E which... grounds A, these are not scenarios 
where A grounds itself or is somehow a causa sui.  Or at the very least, this seems plausible for many 
of the entities in these loops:  maybe TFSBL or The One are most naturally thought of as self-
grounders, but entities in the "middle" of each loop, e.g. a given human hand, are not naturally thought 
of as self-grounders. 
 
Even aside from this natural thought, it will be interesting to explore what the options are here for 
recovering local irreflexivity, asymmetry and transitivity in cosmic loop scenarios.  That is, to what 
extent can we "save the appearances" and allow that even if, on some cosmic scale, there is a loop of 
grounding, we need not change our attitudes to the grounding relationships that hold e.g. between the 
cells and other components of my hand and my hand itself, or between the distribution of rain, clouds, 
and lightning, on the one hand, and a thunderstorm, on the other?  Can things as we ordinarily take 
them to be be embedded in a cosmos containing one or more cosmic loops at scales we are unfamiliar 
with?  (Compare:  in a universe with a unique big crunch that is immediately before its unique big 
bang, the direction of time might still be locally one-way, with no small loops letting people live 
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through 2014 before 2013.)    
 
What would "local" mean in this context?  One stab at characterising it would be to say that grounding 
is locally irreflexive, asymmetry and transitive iff when we restrict the domain of entities quantified 
over to some domain D, then for all x in D, x does not ground x, for all x and y in D, if x grounds y 
then y does not ground x, and for all x, y and z in D, if x grounds y and y grounds z, then x grounds z.  
Then we should insist on some restrictions on the appropriate D so that it is appropriately "local".  We 
would be aiming to capture the idea that with a certain "distance", grounding behaves as if it is 
irreflexive, asymmetric and transitive, and cases where there are loops of ground only show up when 
we look at "long distances".  The challenge then is to specify the relevant domains D that are "local" to 
each other, or alternatively to specify a "distance" so that any entities within that distance of a given 
object O count as belonging to the same domain D as O. 
 
One way to pursue the former strategy would be to find some independent way of specifying domains 
and which objects share a common domain.  Perhaps each of Rucker's "universes" could be its own 
domain, for example.  One way to pursue the latter strategy would be to say that a domain D is local if 
there are no more than n steps of immediate grounding between any two members of D, for some 
suitably low n.  This would require that we rely on a notion of "immediate ground", and find a way to 
apply it to the grounding chains we are concerned with.  Sometimes it is easy to see what immediate 
ground would be: intuitively, the singleton of Socrates is immediately grounded in Socrates, but the 
singleton of the singleton of Socrates is plausibly immediately grounded only in the singleton of 
Socrates, and its grounding in Socrates is only mediate.  In other cases, though, it is harder to draw the 
distinction.  Am I immediately grounded in my cells, or only immediately grounded in objects such as 
my brain and liver, and only mediately (partially) grounded in my liver cells?  Or am I immediately 
grounded in all my parts, down to the quarks and leptons?  If we were to apply notions of immediate 
and mediate grounding in one's parts in the Rucker world, for example, we would at least want it to 
turn out that I was not immediately grounded in any of the galaxies that are parts of one of my 
electrons: though we may have to add stipulations to the original thought experiment if we wanted to 
guarantee this. 
 
While an account of locality that appeals to immediate ground might capture a sufficient condition for a 
domain d to be of objects "local" to each other, it is probably too restrictive, in several ways.   One is 
that there may well be cases where there is grounding, but no immediate grounding.  This could be 
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because some forms of grounding do not lend themselves to an immediate/mediate distinction, and it 
could also be because there may well be cases where a kind of grounding is in general amenable to that 
distinction, but unusual cases defy categorisation.  Consider this sort of structure: suppose that we have 
an infinite sequence where, for each finite stage, each stage after the first is immediately grounded in 
the stage below.  Suppose now that this sequence has a first "infinite" member:  if we were ordering the 
stages by ordinals, we would assign that stage the ordinal ω.  That stage may be plausibly grounded in 
the stages that came before, but not plausibly immediately grounded in any of them: there is no stage 
"immediately before" it in the series.  One might even think the ordinals themselves are like this.  It is 
more usual to think that ordinals are immediately grounded in all the ordinals that precede them (if 
"member of" corresponds to immediate grounding, and we accept the von Neumann definition of 
ordinals), but orthodoxy here is not compulsory.  
 
Another challenge the particular account of "locality" offered here faces, even apart from any concerns 
about its relying on a notion of immediate ground, is that it does not yet rule out gerrymandered 
"neighbourhoods".  A selection of a handful of things that do not stand in any chains of grounding to 
each other will count as a "neighbourhood":  one of my electrons, the singleton of Socrates, and 
Abraham Lincoln's last thought is an example of a 3-membered domain that we may want to rule out as 
one of the relevant domains D that we are defining locality over.  On the other hand, we do not want to 
insist that every member of D either grounds, or is grounded by, every other:  if we want these domains 
to include ones we typically think about, we might want to include me, and all of my quarks and 
leptons, as well as intermediate parts, in a single D, without insisting that each of my electrons either 
grounds, or is grounded by, each of the others.       
 
I will resist the temptation to go down the rabbit-hole of developing and critiquing different criteria we 
might have for selecting a domain D, and ensuring that each domain shares a "locality" in an intuitive 
sense.  Instead, I will turn to a different challenge.  To ensure that grounding can be "locally" 
irreflexive and asymmetric, transitivity must fail somewhere in the cosmic loop—otherwise everything 
in the loop will ground itself, for example, since we will be able to go from a thing back to itself by 
steps of grounding.  (A failure of irreflexivity is automatically also a failure of asymmetry).  The 
challenge then is to say how grounding could fail to be transitive around the whole loop while being 
locally transitive, especially if we desire that it is locally transitive everywhere:  otherwise enough 
applications of local transitivity might take us around the whole loop, provided the "locations" overlap. 
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There are a few ways to try to satisfy the demand for local transitivity in the face of this need for a 
counterexample to transitivity somewhere in the loop.  The most conservative way would be to 
abandon the demand for local transitivity everywhere:  perhaps there are no counterexamples to 
transitivity in parts of the cosmos we are familiar with, but the counterexamples occur somewhere else.  
A version of this strategy that would work with case 3 would be to insist that grounding per se is not 
transitive, but only the species of grounding are (in case 3, emanation and constitution).  In the second 
variant of case 3, for example, the obvious point where the counterexample to transitivity of grounding 
would occur is from the ones to the One and then to Wisdom, since the ones constitute The One but 
Wisdom only stands in the emanation relation from The One. 
 
Suppose we wanted to get closer to the idea that grounding was always locally transitive.  We could 
tinker with our account of what entities are "local" to which, so counterexamples to transitivity only 
occur when entities do not share a locality (e.g. if there were clear borders between cosmoi in the 
Rucker loop, perhaps two entities would need to share a cosmos to be local to each other).  Or we could 
wheel out more high-powered philosophical resources.  One traditional area where philosophers have 
struggled with the conflicting desires to have a local inheritance principle that fails over longer 
distances is in dealing with the paradoxes of vagueness:  in the sorites paradox, for example, we would 
like to hold onto the idea that subtracting one grain of sand from a heap always leaves a heap, but also 
to the idea that subtraction of enough grains of sand turns a heap to a non-heap.  Likewise, if we want 
local transitivity without full-strength transitivity, we would like the ground of a ground to always be a 
ground, but there to be some number of iterations of the immediate grounding relation that takes us 
from a ground to a non-ground, with it being vague where the series breaks down.  Perhaps resources 
developed to help with the sorites could be employed to help with the marriage of local transitivity to a 
failure of full-strength transitivity? 
 
The literature on ways to resist the sorites paradox is vast, and so I will not try to list all the available 
options here.  Options include taking the transitivity principle to have no false instances, but some 
instances that fail to be true (as with supervaluationist approaches, for example); or to think that some 
instances of the transitivity principle are almost fully true, and perhaps all steps involving immediate 
grounding are true enough to assert, though the slow leakage of truth from antecedent to consequent in 
each instance allows us to have a series of steps of x1 immediately grounding x2, x2 immediately 
grounding x3 etc. without it being at all true that x1 grounds x1000 (as in fuzzy-logical treatments of 
vagueness).  Both of these approaches compromise the (full) truth of the general transitivity principle, 
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while salvaging the absence of some kinds of counter-examples—there will be no particular "break" in 
the chain to be identified. 
 
Other, slightly more exotic, options, would be to retain the full truth of the transitivity principle but 
weaken our logical resources so that we cannot validly apply it multiple times: just as we cannot 
validly reach the conclusion that a single grain of sand is a heap, we will not be able to validly reach 
the conclusion that x1 grounds x1000, even if x1 grounds x2, and x2 grounds x3, and grounding is 
transitive.  Ways of doing something similar in the case of the sorites include the contraction-free 
approach explored by Slaney 1988 and Restall 1994 ch 8, and the intransitivity-of-validity approach 
explored by Cobreros et. al 2012, among others.  Yet another option would be to adopt an approach that 
rendered at least the material version of transitivity true while making it unsuitable for use in inferring 
the consequent from the antecedent, by analogy with the subvaluational approach to vagueness 
explored in Hyde 1997.  I am inclined to think that any commitment to transitivity of grounding would 
not be strong enough to motivate these sort of logical modifications to preserve local transitivity of 
grounding:  but those already keen on these resources, perhaps to preserve tolerance principles in vague 
cases, may find it appealing to treat apparent failure of transitivity in cosmic loop cases with similar 
resources. 
 
Armed with an understanding of how to ensure local transitivity and asymmetry without global 
transitivity in cases of loops of grounding (whichever understanding we might adopt), we can apply the 
same resources to other relations of interest, including those that appear to underpin grounding 
relationships.  One thing that makes Rucker loops so mind-bending, for example, is that they challenge 
our assumptions about the part-whole relationship:  that I, for example, could be a proper-part of a 
proper-part of a proper-part of... myself.  That would be impossible were the proper-part relation both 
asymmetric and transitive.  However, one thing that makes the case less mind-bending than short loops 
of the proper-parthood relation (e.g. just stipulating that A is a proper part of B and B is a proper part of 
A) is that in a Rucker world with local transitivity and asymmetry the relation of proper-part to whole 
would behave just as it actually does in cases we are familiar with:  I am part of the Milky Way Galaxy, 
but the Milky Way Galaxy is not part of me.  This is not the only way to conceive of a Rucker loop, of 
course:  another way would be to conceive of the Milky Way as being one of my parts, but just much 
further down a natural chain of part-to-whole than one might have thought.  But at least the option of 
retaining local transitivity and asymmetry gives us one way to think of the Rucker loop scenario as 
being one in which our ordinary particular judgements about what is part of what do not need to be 
 15 
revised. 
 
Similar devices could also be deployed if we wished to claim there was local near-transitivity, near-
asymmetry and near-irreflexivity of ground and of other notions.  After all, a number of authors have 
wanted to motivate exceptions to each of these principles independently of anything to do with very 
long chains of ground.  See, for example, Jenkins 2011 on reflexivity, Barnes (manuscript), on 
symmetry, Schaffer 2012 on transitivity, and Bliss 2011 on all three, as well as many of the other 
papers in this volume.  One, perhaps inelegant, way to modify local transitivity to local near-
transitivity, for example, would be to say that except for such-and-such cases grounding is locally 
transitive within a domain D.  A more elegant way to specify local near-transitivity would be to have a 
positive story about when, for entities among a given D, it is the case that when x grounds y and y 
grounds z, x also grounds z.  Even more elegant would be such a principle that applies to all "local" 
domains D at once, rather than separately specified principles about each D individually. 
 
Suppose we do secure local transitivity (or something close to it) without requiring transitivity tout 
court.  What advantages could that offer a theory that postulated a cosmic loop?  One advantage is that 
grounding relationships would be more selective.  A grounding loop which is transitive requires 
everything in the loop to ground everything else in that loop, which might sometimes seem 
counterintuitive:  even if both the Milky Way and an electron in it are part of the one Rucker loop, 
intuitively the electron partly grounds the Milky Way and not the other way around.  Perhaps we should 
think that cosmic loops where grounding is transitive, and so everything in a loop grounds everything 
else in that loop, are also conceivable and maybe possible:  but it is natural to think that not all 
grounding loops are like this, and perhaps not the ones that most naturally come to mind when 
presented with cases like those given in section 2. 
 
Another advantage follows if we antecedently thought that instances of grounding we are familiar with 
appear to never relate entities to themselves, relate in an asymmetric "direction", and at least appear 
transitive.  While there are many papers in this volume that will argue that even grounding we are 
familiar with need not always be like this, we retain the option of leaving our theory of the grounding 
relationships between familiar entities as being traditional, while accepting (or leaving open the 
possibility) that there are cosmic grounding loops outside our familiar domain.  The options for 
preserving local transitivity will also be valuable, apart from any doctrines about grounding, when 
dealing with other metaphysical relationships we are tempted to think are asymmetric and transitive, 
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such as the relation of part-to-whole.  The Rucker loop, for example  promises to shed light on the 
conceivable, and perhaps possible, options for mereology as well as for grounding. 
 
Those suggesting philosophical innovations, or even scepticism about received wisdom, are often under 
pressure to "save the phenomena":  to explain why it seemed that the old orthodoxy was right, or why 
we can often rely on generalisations or inferences supported by the old orthodoxy.  For example, the 
nihilist about tables and chairs owes us a story of our apparent success in home decoration and lunch 
preparation, or the dialethiest logician owes us a story about why classical mathematics seems to have 
been such a success in the twentieth century while apparently relying on classical logic.  One way to 
"save the phenomena" is to corral exceptions to previous orthodoxies to cases that are relatively 
unusual:  classical physics can be used to build bridges or aim cannon, because e.g. moving objects do 
not get appreciably more massive as they speed up until they get to speeds close to the speed of light.  
Recovering "local" transitivity, asymmetry and irreflexivity for grounding is one way to show how the 
exceptions to those principles do not show up in the cases we were most familiar with. 
 
Grounding loops will appear exotic to many, but if a theory postulating a grounding loop only offends 
our intuitions in cases far removed from those with which we are familiar, then we may not wish to 
trust our intuitions very far about those cases.  The comparison with theorising about causation may be 
instructive:  while we are, in my view, properly reluctant to abandon the view that  rock throwings 
sometimes cause window breakings or that stockmarket crashes cause unemployment, we are much 
less certain about our ordinary causal generalisations and intuitions when considering cases like 
quantum mechanical phenomena or the big bang.  And rightly so:  exotic phenomena might behave 
exotically.  To work out whether there are cosmic loops of ground, or of part-whole, or other such 
relations, we would do well not to just trust our off-the-cuff generalisations but to carefully investigate 
cases outside familiar ones. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
Cosmic loops are of intrinsic interest:  thinking about them can satisfy the same urges to grapple with 
the unfamiliar which are satisfied by various sorts of speculative fiction, from science fiction to the 
stories of Borges.  Metaphysical fiction is a genre in its infancy, but a promising one for all that. 
 
I have argued that thinking about cosmic loops serves several more academic purposes, however.  They 
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demonstrate, that we can make sense of loops of ground in a different way from the usual examples of 
loops achieved through only a few steps, and the conceivability and perhaps possibility of them are 
supported in ways different from other arguments I know of to support failures of asymmetry and 
transitivity.  This should give us additional reason, were additional reason needed, to admit the 
conceivability, and consider seriously the possibility, that grounding need not be transitive (and to a 
lesser extent, reason to take non-symmetry seriously, if we think that some cosmic loops of ground are 
not counterexamples to transitivity).  Finally, through exploring options for recovering local transitivity 
(and so local asymmetry and irreflexivity, should we want them), we can see that confidence about 
grounding relations between familiar items should not lead us to overconfidence about general 
principles of ground, no more than experiencing the local asymmetry of the direction of time should 
lead us to assert dogmatically that cosmic temporal loops are impossible. 
 
Those who want to reject the possibility of cosmic loops, let alone those who reject the coherence of 
them, would be well served to defend the principles they think rule out such loops, rather than just 
taking those principles to be obvious or analytic.  And this applies just as much to cosmic loops of part-
to-whole, or cosmic loops of any other relation, as it does to cosmic loops of grounding.  Metaphysics, 
with its hope to be a completely general investigation of what there is, should be particularly wary of 
the perils of overgeneralisation.5 
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